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WHAT YOUR COMPLIANCE OFFICER 
IS – AND IS NOT 
BARRY S. HERRIN, FAHIMA, FHIMSS, FACHE, ESQ.† 
In the strange way that thoughts connect and evolve, an experience I had 
on October 11, 2019 as a panelist for the University of Maryland Carey Law’s 
In-House Counsel Roundtable1 just came back to mind as I read an online post 
from one of those accounting firms that sounds like people really wanting to be 
lawyers who are trapped in the license of accountants.  Everyone is giving advice 
on what to do during and after our experience with COVID-19, and you have 
already heard from me on this point.2  However, this particular measure of 
information is meant to address a disturbing trend highlighted in both my panel 
experience and in the accounting firm post, which is the misunderstanding of the 
separate roles of the compliance officer and counsel, and—of more immediate 
concern—the unhelpful (and in some cases dangerous) broadening of the role of 
the compliance officer into an all-laws inspector general for the healthcare 
enterprise. 
THE MODERN ORIGIN OF THE HEALTHCARE COMPLIANCE OFFICER 
In guidance issued in 19983 by the Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) of 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), the OIG strongly 
suggested that “effective internal controls that promote adherence to applicable 
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him at barry.herrin@herrinhealthlaw.com.  
 1. Further details and information regarding this event can be found at: Hot Topics for In-House 
Counsel at Health Care Institutions, UNIV. OF MD. FRANCIS KING CAREY SCH. L., (Oct. 11, 2019), 
https://www.law.umaryland.edu/Programs-and-Impact/Health-Law/Events/AHLA/.  
 2. Barry Herrin, Teleworking Due to COVID-19? Protect PHI From Security Threats, Starting 
with this Policy, HERRIN HEALTH L., https://herrinhealthlaw.com/teleworking-due-to-covid-19-protect-
phi-from-security-threats-with-this-policy/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2021). 
 3. 63 Fed. Reg. 8987 (Feb. 23, 1998), as supplemented by 70 Fed. Reg. 4858 (Jan. 31, 2005). 
06 HERRIN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2021  12:54 PM 
140 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 24:1 
 
federal and state law, and the program requirements of Federal, State and private 
health plans” will “significantly advance the prevention of fraud, waste, and 
abuse in these health care plans” and will permit the OIG to lessen any penalties 
imposed on a provider either under the Medicare program or under the False 
Claims Act.4  The OIG states in this guidance that compliance plans may have 
collateral benefits to a hospital, but it is clear that the focus of the compliance 
effort is for the hospital to “[fulfill] its legal duty to ensure that it is not submitting 
false or inaccurate claims to government and private payors.”5  Indeed, the 
guidance acknowledges that it “represents the OIG’s suggestions on how a 
hospital can best establish internal controls and monitoring to connect and 
prevent fraudulent activities.”6  This focus on fraud against the government and 
private payors explains why the elements of an “effective” compliance program 
are based on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.7 
Thus, at the outset, hospital compliance efforts were confined to billing and 
coding compliance, which necessarily involved medical record documentation 
issues as well as compliance with the federal Anti-kickback8 and “Stark”9 
statutes and corresponding regulations, and other Medicare programmatic issues 
such as patient choice and “patient dumping” that would violate EMTALA.10 
The guidance also explicitly states that “every hospital should designate a 
compliance officer to serve as the focal point for compliance actions.”11  And, 
mirroring the modern military model of the Inspector General, the compliance 
officer when acting in that function12 has to have direct access to the hospital 
CEO and governing body.13 
This “strongly suggested” structure created a separate person independently 
responsible for managing billing, coding, and physician relationship risk.  This 
person, who was not governed by the hospital’s general counsel or any other 
institutional risk managers, could independently affect hospital policy without 
the necessity of consulting with counsel before beginning an investigation into 
alleged wrongful conduct.  The responsibility for coordinating the hospital’s risk 
response therefore became the sole obligation of the hospital’s CEO or governing 
 
 4. Id. at 8988. 
 5. Id.  
 6. Id. (emphasis added).  
 7. 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (providing expanded federal felony treatment to the defrauding of private 
healthcare payors under HIPAA); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A.2, cmt. n.3(k) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018). 
 8. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b); 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2021). 
 9. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn; 42 C.F.R. § 411.350 (2020). 
 10. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. 
 11. 63 Fed. Reg. at 8993. 
 12. The compliance officer can be a person with additional duties. Id. 
 13. Id.  
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body, which had to act affirmatively to involve counsel after a report had been 
made. 
“SCOPE CREEP” AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE ETHICS AND COMPLIANCE 
OFFICER 
To understand how the role of what started as a coding and billing 
compliance job evolved into what one hospital executive referred to as an “all-
powerful freelance busybody,” it might be helpful to understand how hospital 
ethics started and then blended into compliance.  In considering this evolution, 
ethics as a discipline is distinct from compliance in one critical respect: 
compliance is mandatory, whereas ethics are usually aspirational.  Once an 
ethical principle is made mandatory, it ceases to be ethical and becomes a matter 
of compliance.  A Forbes article written by Bruce Weinstein in 2019 quotes Carol 
Tate, the then director of Ethics and Legal Compliance for Intel: “Ethics goes 
beyond what the law requires.  It involves doing the right thing and following 
both the spirit and not just the letter of the law.”14   
In healthcare, both the American Hospital Association and the American 
College of Healthcare Executives have established codes of ethics which their 
respective members are “required” to follow.15  However, as these are voluntary 
membership organizations, their definitions of “right” have limited impact.  
Some hospitals have bioethics committees that decide end-of-life and other 
patient care matters, but those are often burdened by legal requirements that 
significantly constrain the conduct supposedly within the purview of the 
committee.16  Thus, the only way in which ethics create a burden on an 
organization is when a system of “mandated ethics” requires compliance over 
and above that compliance indicated by external laws and regulations.  The old 
joke that business ethics is an oxymoron or the continual misunderstanding about 
why lawyers represent “guilty” criminal defendants both illustrate a practical 
aspect of this compliance/ethics dichotomy: who gets to decide what’s “right”?  
This system of “government by good idea” is limited only by the ability of 
the organization to coerce its employees to do what the organization says is 
 
 14. Bruce Weinstein, What’s the Difference Between Compliance and Ethics, FORBES (May 9, 
2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bruceweinstein/2019/05/09/whats-the-difference-between-
compliance-and-ethics/#5f3498347524. 
 15. See, e.g., ACHE CODE OF ETHICS (AM. COLL. OF HEALTHCARE EXECS. Nov. 13, 2017), 
https://www.ache.org/about-ache/our-story/our-commitments/ethics/ache-code-of-ethics; GUIDELINES 
ON ETHICAL CONDUCT AND RELATIONSHIPS FOR HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS (AM. HOSP. ASS’N 1974), 
http://ethics.iit.edu/codes/AHA%201974.pdf. 
 16. See, e.g., In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 598 (4th Cir. 1994). An example of such a decision is the 
withholding of medical care agreed to be clinically futile, but which is nevertheless required by federal 
law governing emergency treatment. See id. Even if higher-minded and grounded in deep principles, 
ethics always yields to compliance. 
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“right.”17  The Forbes article further quotes Carol Tate: “If the company has a 
poor culture, none of its controls, policies, or procedures will matter.”18  This, of 
course, presumes that the company’s ethics statements are pervasive in the 
company’s culture and not merely a statement in the employee handbook.  
Converting a business’s beliefs about the world and its place in it to 
disciplinary offenses capable of investigation and punishment could rightly be 
seen as an expansion of the role of the human resources department or another 
branch of administration.  Why did this authority accrue to the person in charge 
of billing and coding oversight?  The short answer may lie in the way the 
government (other than HHS) views ethics as a part of compliance and 
particularly in how the government enforces the Federal Acquisition Regulations 
(“FARs”).19  
Although the FARs specifically do not apply to Medicare,20 the notion of 
“best practices”21 and the now-vogueish practice in health care of borrowing 
leadership and management insight from other industries22 may just have given 
the compliance “industry” the leverage it needed to expand its mandate.  The 
FARs require that any contractor granted a contract subject to the FARs must 
have “a written code of business ethics and conduct” in place within thirty (30) 
days of the contract’s awarding and must at all times “promote an organizational 
culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with 
the law.”23  In this definition, ethics and compliance are clearly separate. 
However, although the FARs do not require reports to the government for 
violations of the code of ethics, the contractor is specifically required to 
undertake “reasonable efforts not to include an individual as a principal24 whom 
due diligence would have exposed as having engaged in conduct that is in 
conflict with the contractor’s code of business ethics and conduct.”25 
 
 17. Weinstein, supra note 14.  
 18. Id.  
 19. FAR 1.101-102 (2021).  
 20. 42 C.F.R. § 417.472(d) (2020). 
 21. See Shane Snow, Problem With Best Practices, FAST CO. (Oct. 15, 2015), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/3052222/the-problem-with-best-practices (calling out this sort of “peer 
benchmarking” as “making you the average of everyone else that follows [those practices].”). 
 22. See, e.g., JOHN J. NANCE, WHY HOSPITALS SHOULD FLY: THE ULTIMATE FLIGHT PLAN TO 
PATIENT SAFETY AND QUALITY CARE (2008) (comparing the healthcare industry to the airline industry); 
CHARLES PROTZMAN ET AL., LEVERAGING LEAN IN HEALTHCARE: TRANSFORMING YOUR ENTERPRISE 
INTO A HIGH QUALITY PATIENT CARE DELIVERY SYSTEM (2010) (comparing the healthcare industry to 
the automobile manufacturing industry).  
 23. FAR 52.203-13(b) (2020). 
 24. See FAR 52.209-7 (2018) (defining principal as an “officer, director, owner, partner, or a 
person having primary management or supervisory responsibilities.”). 
 25. FAR 203-13(c)(2)(ii)(B) (2020). 
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So, even though the FARs do not mandate compliance with the contractor’s 
code of ethics, the contractor is required to try to remove from any position of 
ownership or control any person who in the past (or at any time?) has done 
anything inconsistent with this once-aspirational code.26  Contrast this with the 
approach taken by HHS with respect to Medicare participants, which only 
excludes persons from ownership or control positions who commit certain 
criminal offenses and program-related misconduct,27 and you can see what an 
incredible broadening of the role and authority of the compliance officer 
occurred, going from simply billing and coding auditing to controlling the 
oversight of corporate governance and organizational mission, vision, and values 
— areas that in the main do not involve satisfying any legal requirements.  As if 
by magic, culture is thus linked with the eligibility to receive government 
contracts, and the compliance officer can now enforce and punish lapses in what 
most businesses formerly thought were only goals and ideals.  
THE USE OF LAW SCHOOL GRADUATES AS COMPLIANCE OFFICERS 
With the growth of the oversight mandate of healthcare compliance officers 
came the need for broader training of and experience for these individuals.  Into 
the void began stepping a variety of “credentialing” organizations, which 
collectively created an alphabet of new acronyms meant to “demonstrate” 
competence and expertise in this new hospital compliance “industry,” and each 
of which charge dues, exam fees, continuing education fees, etc.  For example, 
there is the Certified Professional Compliance Officer, created by the American 
Association of Professional Coders; the Certificate In Healthcare Compliance, 
created by the Health Care Compliance Association; the Certified Compliance 
and Ethics Professional, created by the Society of Corporate Compliance and 
Ethics (which until recently was controlled by the same people that ran the Health 
Care Compliance Association); the Advanced Practitioner in Ethics and 
Compliance, created by the Ethics and Compliance Officer Association; the 
Certified Compliance Technician, created by the American Association of 
Healthcare Administrative Management; and surely others that escaped a ten-
minute Internet search. 
 Make no mistake about it: I have plenty of initials after my name, and I 
personally think those have value.  However, passing a test on certain discrete 
topics and sitting in unevaluated continuing education classes are no substitute 
for the academic rigor of the Socratic dialogue and the change in the way one 
thinks critically about issues and problem-solving conveyed in the formal 
professional education of – oh, I don’t know – lawyers.  So, rather than shrink 
 
 26. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.  
 27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320(a)-7(a), 7(c). 
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the clearly overbroad scope of the ethics and compliance officer to one 
manageable by a person without a post-graduate legal education, the healthcare 
industry has doubled-down on the job description as expanded and now hires 
people with academic training in law to act — not as counsel — but as 
compliance officers.  
Such a strategy might place highly trained critical thinkers in a position 
requiring that skill set, but it also unhelpfully blurs the line between counsel and 
compliance officer, especially when the compliance officer holds an active 
license as an attorney in the state where the enterprise operates.  This is because 
lawyers have their own ethical and professional responsibilities that come with 
their license to practice law.  The most important of these responsibilities is the 
maintenance of the attorney-client privilege when an attorney is consulted in his 
capacity as an attorney.28  Unlike the armed services, civilian businesses do not 
enjoy the convenience of knowing which people in an executive meeting are 
functioning as lawyers simply by looking at their clothing.29  The burden 
therefore falls on the licensed attorney to ensure that a client (who consults the 
attorney in his capacity as an attorney) gets the benefit of the privilege with an 
attorney when a businessperson (who consults a compliance officer in his 
capacity as something other than an attorney) does not. 
Simply stated, the attorney-client privilege is a rule of evidence that is 
owned by the client and protects an attorney’s communications with the client 
from disclosure in legal and other proceedings.30 It can only be waived by the 
client.31  It follows, therefore,32 that the role of the attorney as an attorney is 
critical to determining whether the attorney-client privilege actually is available.  
For example, there are judicial decisions making communications from a 
corporate employee or official with a duty to investigate incidents discoverable 
 
 28. Jackie Unger, Maintaining the Privilege: A Refresher on Important Aspect of the Attorney-





 29. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Sec’y of the Air Force to Members of the Air Force on Air 
Force Guidance Memorandum to AFI 26-2903 Dress and Personal Appearance of Air Force Personnel 
(Feb. 15, 2020), https://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_a1/publication/afi36-2903/afi36-
2903.pdf (limiting the wear of the judge advocate insignia to those individuals appointed as and serving 
as military lawyers, the distinction being an “occupation badge” and not a “qualification badge”). 
 30. FED. R. EVID. 502. 
 31. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2003) (“A lawyer shall not 
reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the 
disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, or the disclosure is permitted 
by paragraph (b).”). 
 32. “As clear as is the summer’s sun,” said the Archbishop of Canterbury in recounting a tedious 
description of French heraldic descent. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Henry V act I, sc. 2 l. 88. 
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and not subject to any confidentiality restrictions.33  One such decision is Long 
v. Anderson University, in which a federal court in Indiana compelled the 
production of internal investigative materials because the investigation was 
conducted in accordance with the university’s harassment policy, and not 
specifically at the direction of counsel in anticipation of litigation.34  In addition, 
another federal  court in Minnesota explained, the delegation of “ordinary 
business obligations” to a licensed attorney does not result in the application of 
the attorney-client privilege.35  And, as if these rulings are not sufficiently 
damaging, other federal courts have held that the privilege would not apply to 
“any communication that would have been made because of a business purpose 
even if there had been no perceived additional interest in securing legal advice.”36 
A broad mandate for a compliance officer to investigate breaches of policy and 
internal guidance would certainly fall into these categories, and it would not 
appear to make any difference to the courts that the compliance officer was a 
licensed attorney: everything the compliance officer did would be discoverable 
by the government, by the plaintiff’s bar, or (if the hospital is a public entity) by 
its competitors in an open records request.  
THE GENERAL COUNSEL AS COMPLIANCE OFFICER 
As if the growth in the portfolio of the healthcare compliance officer is not 
bad enough for organizations and their management (or mismanagement) of the 
attorney-client privilege, many have decided to get more “bang for the buck” and 
have lawyers functioning in the dual role of compliance officer and general 
counsel.  
For the attorney-client privilege to attach, the communication (a) must 
relate to a fact communicated for the purpose of receiving legal advice and (b) 
must be communicated to the attorney in his capacity as an attorney and not in 
some other capacity.37  Courts around the country are singularly unforgiving of 
this line-blurring duality.  Thus, in In Re Grand Jury Proceedings of Browning 
Arms Co., the Eighth Circuit held that the privilege was inapplicable to 
communications between the corporation and an attorney serving on its board of 
directors because the relationship was not explicitly that of attorney and client.38 
 
 33. Long v. Anderson University, 204 F.R.D. 129 (S.D. Ind. 2001). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Lumber v. PPG Indus., Inc., 168 F.R.D. 641, 646 (D. Minn. 1996) (Memorandum Order, 
Aug. 16, 1996) (“[The] mere involvement of an attorney, in the ordinary business activities of a party, 
cannot legitimately shield those activities from discovery [and would] create a blanket obstruction to 
discovery of its claims investigation.”). 
 36. McCaugherty v. Siffermann, 132 F.R.D. 234, 238 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (citing Fisher v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1975)). 
 37. FED. R. EVID. 502. 
 38. 528 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1976). 
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Courts have also held communications with an attorney who is functioning as an 
attorney, for the purpose of obtaining political rather than legal advice, are also 
not subject to the privilege.39  Additionally, communications about legal 
procedures and case status, when legal advice is not being sought, also are not 
protected.40  Furthermore, if the attorney is consulted about business advice 
rather than legal advice, the privilege does not apply.41  And, just to make sure 
there are no misunderstandings, courts have also held merely having an attorney 
in the room does not convert everything said in the room to a privileged 
communication.42 
And it’s not just the courts that are critical of this dual hat approach. 
Guidance issued by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services clearly 
states that, for Medicare Advantage organizations,43 “the compliance officer 
should be independent [and] not serve in both compliance and operational areas 
(e.g., where the compliance officer is also the … general counsel),” because this 
leads to “self-policing in the operational area” and a conflict of interest.44  There 
is other evidence of disapproval in the text of several corporate integrity 
agreements (“CIAs”) that resolve federal fraud and False Claims Act cases.  One 
such CIA with Pfizer in 2009 explicitly stated that the organization have a “Chief 
Compliance Officer [who] shall not be, or be subordinate to, the General Counsel 
or Chief Financial Officer.”45 
WHAT TO DO? 
With respect to the “scope creep” of healthcare compliance officers, the 
best solution is to limit their role to that required by federal and state law 
governing billing, coding, and physician relationship compliance matters.  If 
organizations are not required by the FARs or some other legal construct to blur 
the distinctions between ethics and compliance, they should not ever do that 
voluntarily.  Organizations should separate compliance enforcement and 
investigation from lapses in aspirational business goals and ideals, for the simple 
reason that if you think it is hard for attorneys with lots of specific training on 
 
 39. Republican Party of North Carolina v. Martin, 136 F.R.D. 421, 426 (E.D.N.C. 1991). 
 40. Hartsell v. Hartsell, 393 S.E.2d 570, 578 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990), aff’d per curiam, 403 S.E.2d 
307 (N.C. 1991). 
 41. Ray v. Cutter Laboratories, 746 F. Supp. 86, 87 (M.D. Fla. 1990). 
 42. United States v. Johnston, 146 F.3d 785, 794 (10th Cir. 1998), cert denied, 525 U.S. 1088 
(1999). 
 43. Press Release, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicare Advantage and the PI 
Program FAQs (on file with agency). 
 44. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicare Managed Car Manual, C.M.S. Pub. 
100-16, Ch. 21, §50.2.1 (2013). 
 45. Corporate Integrity Agreement between Office of the Inspector General and Pfizer, Inc. (Aug. 
31, 2009). 
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this subject to sort out when something is covered by the privilege or not, it is 
going to be even more difficult for a compliance officer not to approach ethics 
issues with the same investigative zeal if they are all within his mandate.  
Remember that the issue of compliance ultimately is a legal one, so compliance 
officers need to have their excitement checked by counsel, even if the federal 
government has constructed a framework that all but certainly removes factual 
compliance findings from the protection of the attorney-client privilege.  That 
means that compliance officers should not be permitted to say there is a “breach” 
or a “violation” or anything of that sort: they gather facts and present them to the 
governing body, which then asks for a legal opinion from counsel. 
When lawyers act as compliance officers, or as both general counsel and 
compliance officers, this kind of dichotomy will be almost impossible to avoid.  
Bright lines being the easiest to see and avoid, the absolute best practice would 
be not to let compliance officers who are trained as lawyers act as lawyers, going 
so far as asking them to place their licenses in inactive status so that they are 
incapable of practicing law.  Failing that, not allowing compliance officers to use 
their “J.D.” degree description in their official signature would help.  If that 
particular sacred cow is already out of the barn, whether or not it’s kicked over 
the lamp,46 then the burden really falls on the attorney to manage his two-hatted 
wardrobe.  
So, if the enterprise insists on having a general counsel act as compliance 
officer, then there are some steps one can take to help the privilege attach when 
it is important for it to do so: 
 
• In board minutes, clearly identify when the attorney is acting 
as an attorney and delineate what discussions are asking for 
and receiving legal advice. 
• Segregate privileged and nonprivileged communications, 
perhaps by using different signature lines or different email 
accounts. 
• “Flag” communications which contain legal advice or in 
which legal advice is sought. 
• In all cases, the attorney must be clear on what role he is 
playing in the conversation; his actions may inadvertently 
cause a misperception about whether the privilege applies to 
a particular conversation or not. 
 
Perhaps the best quote on this subject I have found comes from Chancellor 
Strine of the Delaware Chancery Court: 
 
 46. See RICHARD F. BALES, THE GREAT CHICAGO FIRE AND THE MYTH OF MRS. O’LEARY’S COW 
(2002) (referring to the urban legend behind the Great Chicago Fire of 1871).  
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The fact that much of the legal advice in this country is now sought 
and rendered by thumbs on fruit devices … that’s something that’s 
going to lead to, frankly, more things people think [are] privileged that 
are not. And the mixing of lawyer roles with business roles is a 
danger.47 
 
Let’s be careful out there. 
 
 
 47. Intel Corp. v. NVIDIA Corp., C.A. No. 4373-VCS (Del. Ch. Apr. 5, 2010). 
